CITATION: Reid v. Reid 2019 ONSC 5621
COURT FILE NO.: FS-14-398227-01
DATE: 20190927

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:	)	
	)	
Karen Jane Reid	)	*B. Ludmer*, for the Applicant
	)	
Applicant	)	
	)	
– and –	)	
	)	
Eric Miller Reid	)	*A. Snelius*, for the Respondent
	)	
Respondent	)	
	)	
	)	
	)	**HEARD: September 25, 2019**

SHORE, J.

[1] Key parts of this decision were delivered orally in court to the parties, including their sixteen-year old daughter, who was represented at the motion by counsel. As such, part of these reasons have been written in a way that I hope A.R. will understand.

[2] There were three motion before me today, one brought by each of the parties, and one brought by their 16-year old child, A.R.. A.R. retained her own counsel who appeared, with leave of the court, on this motion. The motions all centered around where A.R. will attend school this year, which will also dictate where the child will live.

[3] This matter is set down for a two-week trial in January. However, A.R. is currently not attending school, so the motion on this issue needed to proceed. There was other relief requested by the parties in their notice of motion, including A.R.'s request for emancipation, but those matters can all wait to be heard and determined at trial, with a full record before the court. I am only going to deal with the issue of A.R.'s schooling and residence in this interim decision.

Background

[4] It is important to review part of the background in this case, to understand how two parents, who both claim they are good parents, have gotten to a point where their eldest child has missed the first month of school.

[5] There are three children of their marriage, A.R., born April 13, 2003, and the twins, E.R. and H.R., born April 12, 2005.

[6] When the parties separated in April 2014, they were living in Burlington, Ontario. They agreed that a move to Toronto would be in the best interest of the children, so the mother used her share of the proceeds of sale to purchase a house in Toronto (Etobicoke). The father was supposed to follow them to Toronto, but he met his new partner and he moved to Waterdown (now part of Hamilton).

[7] Following separation, the parties were unable to resolve the issues between them and they proceeded to trial in September 2016, before Moore, J., reasons released October 12, 2016. The children were represented by the Office of the Children's Lawyer. An order was made that the children would have their primary residence with the Mother and access to the Father on alternate weekends.

[8] There were findings of fact made during the trial. For the purpose of this motion, the most important finding was that the father had engaged in a campaign to alienate the children from the mother. Moore, J. stated that:

> *To the extent that they have expressed negative views about Karen [the mother] and/or preferring to live with Eric [the father], I am compelled to find that those views have been created, or at a minimum, enforced by Eric's conduct and his steadfast refusal to tell the children anything positive about their mother.*
>
> *To the contrary, Eric campaigned relentlessly and very often inappropriately to paint Karen in a negative light and influenced the girls to state preferences in favour of seeing more of him and living with him." Par 17-18*

[9] However, during the trial, Justice Moore accepted the father's evidence that he now recognized that his conduct and his incessant interference in Karen's parenting time alienated the children from their mother and did not advance the best interest of the children and that he wanted to move forward in a more child focussed manner. He advised the trial judge that he would change his ways and that "he is prepared to move closer to Etobicoke and to negotiate a shared parenting plan that would involve leaving the girls in their current school.". Justice Moore was clear that his order was being made relying on these representations. However, at paragraph 45 of the Order, it was left open to the mother to bring a motion to revisit the issue of custody if the father did not change his conduct.

[10] Sadly, not much changed.

[11] The father did not move closer to Toronto. The level of conflict continued, with the children being placed in the middle.

[12] The evidence before me supports a finding that the father is still unable to be supportive of the children's relationship with their mother, however, he is less overt in his actions. Between May 2017 and November 2018, the children were not returned as per the court order approximately 44 times. Even if this number is not entirely accurate, it is still a staggering number. I will discuss this further below.

[13] In August 2017, the mother had to bring an emergency motion for the father to return A.R. to her care. As a result of the motion, the father's telephone access to the children was suspended for a period of time and the parties were ordered to begin counselling with Lourdes Geraldo.

[14] By December 2017, the mother brought a motion to change the final order of Justice Moore, seeking an order that the father's access be suspended for six months while the family undergoes intensive therapy to address his efforts to alienate the children from their mother. She subsequently amended the relief sought in her motion to change, expanding on the relief being sought. The father also amended the relief he was seeking, to include a variation of Justice Moore's order. This hearing has been set for a two-week trial in January 2020.

[15] In September 2018, the father brought an urgent motion that A.R. be permitted to live with him and attend school in Waterdown. A.R. was 15-years old. The father was under the impression that at the age of sixteen A.R. will automatically be allowed to move. The father abandoned this motion and A.R. returned to live with her mother. The parties proceeded with the various conference required by the Family Law Rules to bring the matter to trial.

[16] In August 2019, following an extended holiday period with the father, A.R. refused to return to her mother. The parties each filed these motion materials.

[17] A.R. is now 16 years old. The Father's submissions rely almost entirely on April's stated preference.

The Legislative Framework:

[18] The issue of whether the court has jurisdiction to make a temporary order pending hearing of a motion to vary a final order was raised. The parties confirmed that they consent to the court assuming jurisdiction in this case because an order is required pending the trial in January. I will proceed on this basis.

[19] Section 17(1)(b) of the *Divorce Act* provides the court with jurisdiction to vary a custody order. Before making an order to vary, the court must satisfy itself that there has been "a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child of the marriage occurring since the making of the custody order" and the court "shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child as determined by reference to that change": *Divorce Act*, s.17(5).

[20] A "child of the marriage" is defined as a child of two spouses or former spouses, who at the material time, is under the age of majority and who had not withdrawn from their charge: *Divorce Act*, s. 2(1).

[21] In making an order, the court must also give effect to the maximum contact rule, which includes "the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such access": *Divorce Act*, s.17(9). In a motion to vary, this consideration applies where the variation order would grant custody of the child to a person who does not currently have custody.

[22] In considering the "best interest of the child" under the *Divorce Act*, cases often refer to the factors set out in section 24 of the *Children's Law Reform Act*. This section provides:

> *24 (1) The merits of an application under this Part in respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined on the basis of the best interests of the child, in accordance with subsections (2), (3) and (4).*
>
> *(2) The court shall consider all the child's needs and circumstances, including,*
> *(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child and,*
> *(i) each person entitled to or claiming custody of or access to the child,*
> *(ii) other members of the child's family who reside with the child, and*
> *(iii) the persons involved in the child's care and upbringing;*
> *(b) the child's views and preferences, if they can be reasonably ascertained;*
> *(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home environment;*
> *(d) the ability and willingness of each person apply for custody of the child to provide the child with guidance and education, the necessities of life and any special needs of the child;*
> *(e) the plan proposed by each person applying for custody of or access to the child for the child's care and upbringing;*
> *(f) the permanence and stability of the family unit with which it is proposed that the child will live;*
> *(g) the ability of each person applying for custody o or access to the child to act as a parent; and*
> *(h) the relationship by blood or through an adoption order between the child and each person who is a party to the application.*

Analysis:

[23] A.R. is 16 years of age. I accept that her strong preference is to live with her father. I also accept that she feels a tremendous amount of stress as a result of the ongoing conflict between her parents. She describes the situation as her parents being engaged in "full blown family warfare" and that it has had "a massive effect" on her. Neither party hears A.R. when she says that "[t]his all out court battle between my parents has affected their ability to relate to us.". If they had, they would or should have changed their ways and resolved the motion before me today. The conflict has gotten so bad that the parties seem unable to act in A.R.'s best interest. The best example of this is the fact that A.R. has missed the first four weeks of school because the parties could not agree on where she would attend school.

[24] I also accept that A.R. and her mother have a difficult relationship, with many ups and downs. A.R. believes that her stress will be alleviated if she lives with her father and attends school in Waterdown.

[25] It is clear from reading A.R.'s affidavits and emails that she is trying so hard to find a way to make both parents happy, even suggesting back in 2018 that she spend 8 nights with her mom and 6 nights with her father. No child should be placed in this position, peacemaker for her parents. It is wrong that A.R. is suffering from anxiety from the stress. None of this is her making.

[26] A.R. has retained her own lawyer (with financial assistance from the father and his family) so that her voice is heard and her preferences and wishes are before the court. A.R., you can be sure that I have heard your position loud and clear.

[27] This decision should have been made by your parents. Your parents were unable to resolve the issue and now the Court is left with having to decide what is in your best interest. Your views and preferences is one consideration, that will certainly factor into my decision, although this is not the only consideration.

Is there a rule that at sixteen a child is absolved from following custody orders and can make their own decision?

[28] The father shared his conviction with A.R. that there is "a rule" that at 16 she can make her own decisions and orders of custody will not be enforced against her. The language used by them in this regard mirror one another. The father's entire position during the motion rested on this "rule".

[29] The case law does not support his position. At the age of 16 a child can withdraw from parental control. There are also certain rights and autonomy afforded to a 16-year old child under the law. A summary of some of these rights can be found in *N.L. v. R.R.M.*, 2016 ONCA 915 ("N.L."), starting at paragraph 112. That does not mean that every 16-year old can dictate where they live or ignore court orders with respect to custody and access, or that every sixteen-year old can withdraw from parental control.

[30] One of the cases relied on by the father (albeit for a different reason) was *S.G.B. v. S.J.L.*, 2010 ONCA 578, a decision of the Court of Appeal. In that case, the child, J.B. was granted leave to intervene in an appeal with respect to a custody order. The Court commented that the child should be allowed to participate in the appeal because he would be affected by the outcome. He was 16-years old and still a child of the marriage. There was no mention in the Court of the custody order not applying to him due to his age. The father also relies on *R.G. v. K.G.*, another Court of Appeal decision, again for a different purpose: 2017 ONCA 108 ("*R.G.*"). But in that case, the child's position was that she had an unfettered right to a declaration that she had withdrawn from parental control, because she was over the age of 16. Justice Benotto, in writing the decision, states clearly "I do not agree with this broad proposition": par 58. The Court ultimately concluded that a declaration was needed, **having regard to the best interest of the child**, not solely based on the child being 16 years of age. The Court explains at par 67 that:

> *"The degree to which the court will follow the wishes of the child will depend upon the age and level of maturity of the child and will be subject to the judge's discretion as she seeks to determine the child's best interests. Where, as here, the child is months away from her eighteenth birthday, a continuation of litigation involving her indicates more about the parent's needs than the child's.".*

[31] The father also relies on N.L., for the proposition that with a child of this age, no declaration is needed, they can simply withdraw from parental control. However, the Court of Appeal in *R.G.* addresses this very issue: see par 61. Unlike in *N.L.*, the child in *R.G.* was the subject of a custody order and embroiled in a "live controversy" about her attendance at university. A declaration was required.

[32] No declaration was needed in *N.L.*. The older son was 18 ½ and at university and the younger son was almost 17, and lived alone in an apartment, but paid for by his mother. Despite their age, the children were still found to be children of the marriage as they depended on support from their mother. On the issue of withdrawing from parental control, Perkins J., specifically states that it would be too easy for an alienating parent to persuade a child to refuse to have any contact with the target parent, and then assert that the child had withdrawn from parental control or from the charge of the parents. There must be some credible evidence of withdrawal from **both** parents: *N.L.* par. 127. Perkins, J., also stated that "[t]here have been alienation cases in which a 16 year old has been put into the custody of the target parent, cut off from contact with the alienating parent, and ordered to take part in a reunification program with the target parent: par. 136.

Determining what is in A.R.'s best interest:

[33] In determining the best interest of the child, I need to consider the various factors in this case. In doing so, I also need to determine how much weight should be given to the child's views and preferences, and whether those views and preference expressed are the true views of the child, or a result of the influence of the father, and whether it even matters. As set out in *N.L.*: "The wishes of an alienated child may be warped and misconceived, but they are nonetheless real".

A.R.'s stated preference and wishes:

[34] A.R. has continued to maintain the position that she wants to live with her father. As A.R. said in July 2018 "I made the decision to live with my father four years ago" (emphasis added).

[35] That perception was initially formed during a time when her father acknowledged he was actively alienating the children from their mother. After hearing evidence at trial, Moore, J. stated that:

> *To the extent that they have expressed negative views about Karen and/or preferring to live with Eric, I am compelled to find that those views have been created, or at a minimum, enforced by Eric's conduct and his steadfast refusal to tell the children anything positive about their mother.*

> *To the contrary, Eric campaigned relentlessly and very often inappropriately to paint Karen in a negative light and influenced the girls to state preferences in favour of seeing more of him and living with him." Par* 17-18

[36] The dynamic has not changed. A.R.'s decision was made during a time her father has acknowledged he was actively working to alienate the children from their mother. Given the age of the children at the time, they likely have no appreciation of the influence their father's actions have had over their current positions and perception of their parents.

[37] I adopt the wording used by Justice Moore following the trial, at paragraph 17 of his judgement, "[T]he actions of these children viewed as a whole belie their words". This continues to hold true today. What this means is that although A.R. has taken certain positions in her written material, her actions indicate otherwise.

[38] A.R., and to some extent her sisters, continue to look for and gather evidence against their mother, which all ends up in the Father's court material. It is not normal behaviour for the children to be regularly videotaping conversations with their mother. A.R. talks about wanting to maintain a relationship with her mother but went almost two months without spending any meaningful time with her, other than one overnight. She took a part-time job recently on Saturdays and Sundays, in Waterdown, which almost guarantees that she will not be seeing her mother on any regular basis, despite stating that she wants to maintain a relationship with her mother. A.R. has difficulty articulating positive attributes about her mother. Further, she is unable to attribute any specific criticism of the father. The children went through a period of time when they would not smile in pictures, even pictures of them with their cousins at the family cottage, a place they enjoy, or while on holiday in Punta Cana over the winter break. The children have acted in ways that would not be tolerated in most households, including yelling explicit profanities at their mother, and in some cases being physically aggressive.

[39] The affidavits of third parties filed by the mother paint a very different picture of the mother, the father and of A.R., than the one painted by A.R. and the father's counsel. The alleged bias of the children towards their mother is relayed in the material from friends, family and the therapist, Lourdes Geraldo. I appreciate that none of the evidence has been tested by cross-examination.

[40] Despite the cause of her preference, A.R. is sixteen years old and her preference needs to be considered. These are still her unwavering views. However, in light of the circumstances of this case, I am not prepared for her preference to be the primary factor for my decision. I need to view her preferences in light of all the other factors.

Other considerations:

[41] Love and affection: I have no doubt that both parties love A.R.. In her materials, A.R. acknowledges that she has love and affection for both parents. A.R. has a close relationship with her sisters, who have their primary residence with the mother. A.R. also seems to have a close relationship with both parents' new partners, Arnie and Chris. I find this to be a neutral factor.

[42] Length of Stable home environment: A.R. has lived with her mother in Toronto since separation. She has never lived in Waterdown. On the evidence before me, it is not clear that A.R. appreciates how much her day-to-day life will change if she moves to Waterdown. Her entire focal point will be shifted, affecting not just her school but friends, extended family and her relationship with her sisters-in essence most of her support system. There is a trial scheduled to take place in three months. It may not be wise to change the current arrangement on conflicting affidavit evidence and pending a trial when full information will be before the court.

[43] I accept that there are problems in A.R.'s relationship with her mother. What is hard to for me to ascertain on the materials before me is whether this is any different than the problems often experienced in relationships between parents and children in their teenage years exerting their independence.

[44] Willingness to provide guidance and education: A.R. has an Individual Education Plan (IEP). Justice Moore commented that the evidence at trial was silent on whether or when that Plan would follow A.R. to Waterdown. Unfortunately, I have no further information before me today.

[45] With respect to guidance, the father has not taken any active steps to correct the damage done to these children during key years of their development, despite his representations before Justice Moore. Even if I were to accept the father's submissions that he is no longer speaking badly about the mother, this is not sufficient to reverse the damage already done. His inaction perpetuates the problem.

[46] He continues to discuss the litigation with the children. There is information relayed in A.R.'s affidavit and letters that she could have only gotten from her father. His disdain for the court was also evident by his turning around and looking at A.R. while rolling his eyes when I was asking questions of the lawyers. He is modelling disrespect of the court. I have doubts as to whether the father is providing proper guidance to the children, and specifically to A.R..

[47] Plan proposed: As set out above, the father's argument relies almost solely on A.R.'s age and stated wishes. Justice Moore, at trial, commented that the father had no real plan of care. Given A.R.'s age, the plan of care becomes less important, but the father does not seem to have given it any thought.

[48] Permanence of Family Stability: Both the mother and the father appear to be in stable relationships. This factor is neutral.

[49] Ability of each party to act as a parent: In this regard, I have concerns with both parties. I accept that the mother has difficulty keeping her feelings about the father from A.R.. The mother has made some real errors in judgement by discussing the issues with the children. Again, the children should not be placed in this position. Further, whether justified or not, the mother is so distrustful of the husband that she reads motives into almost every action or inaction and allows her paranoia to affect her day-to-day parenting of the children.

[50] The Father continues to show a lack of insight into his behaviour and its consequences for the children. More concerning is that he no longer accepts that he played a role in the initial breakdown of the children's relationship with their mother and says his evidence at trial was

possibly the result of his not having counsel. The father has kept up his unrelenting pressure on the mother since trial. This is the third year in a row that he has tried to change A.R.'s primary residence for the start of the school year.

[51] The father hides behind his children and relies on their resistance as an excuse for his non-compliance with the orders and for his failure to return the children to their mother. He is enabling A.R. to ignore the court order. At a minimum, the father would strongly benefit from obtaining better parenting tools. He too has failed to meet his parental obligations.

[52] Both parties have significant room for improvement in meeting their obligation as parents to these children, albeit for very different reasons.

[53] Maximum contact and father's willingness to facilitate contact if change made: The job of a parent is to parent. The father has not taken concrete steps, within his parental authority, to have A.R. comply with the access order.

[54] The father's lack of detail as to efforts he made or steps he can take to ensure compliance with the residential schedule is very telling. Courts require reasonable steps to be taken to ensure that residential schedules are complied with, failing which, contempt orders will be made. The onus of following through on residential plans for a child should properly and reasonably fall upon the parents. The fact that problems have been occurring since shortly after the trial, undermines the husband's defence that he cannot force a sixteen-year old child to comply with the schedule. It also causes me to question whether he will facilitate contact between A.R. and the mother if A.R. moves to the father's home pending trial.

[55] In both *D'Abruzzo v. Giancola*, 2017 CarswellOnt 5528 and *Stuyt v. Stuyt*, (2009) CarswellOnt 3432 (SCJ), the Courts have gone so far as to find parents in contempt of a court order, in situations where the parents relied on the wishes of the child and their alleged inability to force a child to attend at the other parent's home.

[56] I reiterate the sentiments of Aiken, J. in *Stuyt*: In order to meet his own desire that A.R. live with him, the Respondent is undermining A.R.'s respect for the Applicant, for the law, for the courts, for the police, and for authority in general. I worry for A.R. as she moves through her teenage years and her years as a young adult if this is the message she is receiving from her father.

[57] Although the mother may have disdain for the father, she has not withheld the children and has assured that they attend all access time with their father.

Summary:

[58] At the conclusion of the motion, I told the parties that this was going to be a difficult motion to decide. I am required to make the order based on the best interest of the child. There have been no changes to the vast majority of factors given consideration by Justice Moore at trial, including the support systems in place in Toronto, the lack of evidence regarding, for example, the school in Waterdown, plans to replace dentists and doctors, and lack of friends in Waterdown. A.R.'s position has also not changed. Her view at trial was that she wanted to live with her father.

[59] The father needs to show respect to the mother, and specifically in her role as mother to the children. The Father was either not honest in his representation to Justice Moore or he was not committed to making the changes. In any event, as a result, he has continued to cause harm to the children and in their relationship with their mother.

[60] The primary difference from the facts before Justice Moore is that A.R. is now older. On an interim motion, this is not a sufficient reason for me to change the final order. When considering the various factors, but for the age and preferences of the child, I would not hesitate to conclude that it is in the best interest of A.R. to stay with her mother and attend school at Martingrove. I say this because the mother will continue to facilitate the child's access with her father, as she has been doing to date. The father will continue to frustrate the child's access to her mother, as he has been doing to date. The child has love and affection for both parties. I am not convinced the father will facilitate the child's access to her maternal relatives, who have formed an important part of the child's support system. The child has lived with the mother since separation, and the mother's new partner, by all accounts has had a stabling effect on that family unit. The mother has always offered a better plan with respect to providing the child with guidance and education. The father has offered no plan in this regard, other than the child will attend the school near him. I think both parents are struggling to act as parents under the current circumstances. Finally, the two younger children continue to reside with the mother and it is clear that the three children have a close bond.

[61] Further, there is conflicting affidavit evidence before me, none of which has been tested. There is a lot of missing information that should be before the Court to make an informed decision, which will be before the trial judge. The decision to change A.R.'s school will have other serious ramifications for this family. These children need professional help, regardless of where they live, the kind of intervention that cannot be made based on the untested motion material before me. If there is going to be a change in the current order or an order for intensive therapy, I conclude that it can only be done at trial by a judge hearing all of the evidence and having all the information on which to make the decision.

[62] I am going to end by repeating Justice Aitken's words:

> *A parent does not have the option of disobeying court orders that he or she does not like. It is the role of a parent to abide by court orders until such time as the orders have been terminated or varied through legal means. It is also the role of parents to instill in their children a respect of the law and legal institutions. A parent who does not do so does a huge disservice to his or her child-a disservice that can have long lasting ramifications throughout a child's life: Stuyt v. Stuyt, (2009) CarswellOnt 3432 (SCJ), at par 62.*

[63] A.R., you requested that an order be made allowing you to attend for therapy, both on your own and with your mother. I am going to make that order and specifically that your mother commit to attending on a regular and frequent basis. You also asked for the respect to have your preferences and wishes before this court, by retaining your own lawyer. Your lawyer was clear that you were responsible and mature enough to understand the importance of the court process and court orders. I gave your lawyer leave to represent you at this motion. I assure you that I

carefully considered and took seriously your views and preferences and have set out in my reasons how I balanced all of the factors in reaching this decision. This is a temporary order. There will be a trial in a few months. The trial judge will have the benefit of hearing from witnesses. This is a binding court order which directs your parents to enrol you in Martingrove school and requires them to comply with the order. The trial judge will take failure to comply with this order very seriously.

Order:

[64] Order to go as follows:

a. Motion to change the residential schedule of A.R., as set out in the final order of Justice Moore, pending trial is dismissed.

b. A.R. shall be enrolled at and attend Martingrove Collegiate, pending trial. The parties shall ensure that A.R. attends school on a regular and consistent basis.

c. The parties shall ensure the children reside with each parent as set out in the Order of Justice Moore, pending trial.

d. The parties shall continue attending for reconciliation therapy with Ms. Geraldo. Specifically, the parties shall ensure that the therapy takes place on a regular and frequent basis, no less than once a week, pending trail, unless otherwise directed by Ms. Geraldo. Ms. Geraldo will have sole discretion to determine whether both parties need to attend, one party needs to attend, or one party needs to attend with A.R..

e. On consent from A.R, A.R. shall attend for closed therapy, with a therapist recommended by Ms. Geraldo. The therapist shall not be asked to disclose information to either party or to provide evidence at trial. To clarify, this therapist is for A.R., to use at her sole discretion as she needs, without interference or input from either parent. Both parties shall facilitate A.R. attending at the appointments, as booked between A.R. and the therapist. The therapist and Ms. Geraldo may speak to coordinate any issues that should be addressed by Ms. Geraldo in the reconciliation therapy. Both parties shall be equally responsible for the cost of same.

f. Both parties are restrained from making derogatory remarks or communicating derogatory remarks about the other parent to the children or within earshot of the children and will not allow anyone to make derogatory comments about the other parent in front of the children. The parties shall not discuss any of the following subject with the children: the litigation, the legal proceedings, this order, emancipation, the upcoming trial, the parent's feeling/thoughts or the children's feelings/thoughts regarding the proceedings or the other parent, the trial or any outcomes, and they may not communicate any information, in any manner, with respect to same, unless as part of reconciliation therapy with Ms. Geraldo.

g. The parties shall not allow the children to read or view any documentation related to these proceedings.

h. The parties shall not ask the children about their time with the other parent.

i. Both parties shall only show and display respect for the other parent in and around the children.

j. The children shall not be used to convey any communications between the parties.

k. The children shall be allowed to enjoy their time with each parent, without interference from the other parent. As such, there shall be no communication with the children while they are with the other parent pending trial.

l. The children shall not be allowed to tape of video either of the parents. Neither parent may rely on transcripts or recoding of the other parent at trial, without first seeking leave of the trial judge.

m. Neither parent shall suggest or permit disrespectful behaviour while with the other parent.



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Karen Jane Reid

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– and –

Eric Miller Reid

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Shore, J.

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